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Second Century: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory and the Biotechnology Revolution 
 
Abstract 
In addition to its firmly established reputation as a leader in biological research and education, 
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory has also occupied a prominent role in the biotechnology 
industry. Since 1980, the Laboratory has become intimately involved with commercial research, 
forming relationships and collaborative partnerships with major biotech leaders on Long Island 
and elsewhere. This paper will explore the transition of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory (CSHL) 
from an institution dedicated solely to basic scientific research to one that was willing to take on 
a new role in for-profit biotechnology. This transition occurred at a time when academic 
institutions and commercial industries were in general moving closer together. This merging of 
interests, however, came not without concerns about corrupting the “pure” science of the 
academy. Such concerns were present at CSHL in the early 1980s, but they did not prevent the 
institution from making biotechnology—the application of the biological sciences to human 
problems—a part of its larger mission. By the 1990s, involvement in the industry had become a 
visible part of CSHL’s research operations. Several of its scientists started their own companies, 
and the Laboratory, through its support for local start-up firms and business incubators, helped 
turn Long Island into a prominent center of biotechnology. Though CSHL’s involvement with 
biotech continues, the events from the 1970s to the early 2000s constitute the Laboratory’s 
formative initiation into the field. Since they are essential to understanding CSHL’s current 
position in the biological sciences, these years are the focus of this narrative. 
 
Introduction  
Founded in 1890 by the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 
(CSHL) was originally a training center for biology teachers known simply as “the Biological 
Laboratory.” The institution’s early orientation toward both research and education remained a 
part of its mission, and since then, CSHL has stayed in the vanguard of science, with its last six 
decades in particular defined by its important work in molecular biology and genetics. As a 
research field, molecular biology grew out of the intense interest in understanding genetics at the 
chemical level. Classical genetics, the earlier iteration of the study of heredity, had treated genes 
as “black boxes”: integral parts of inheritance whose inner workings were nevertheless a 
mystery. As knowledge and techniques improved, biology moved away from its descriptive 
origins toward probing the molecular mechanisms of life. CSHL—which then comprised the 
Biological Laboratory and the Department of Genetics of the Carnegie Institute of Washington—
supplied many of the key people and ideas in this shift toward molecular genetics; still others 
were intimately linked with the institution. James Watson is perhaps the most famous, having co-
founded the structure of DNA in 1953, a key pivot point in the molecular revolution. Watson had 
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maintained close ties with CSHL both before and after his discovery and eventually became the 
Laboratory’s director in 1968.  
Just as biology itself had evolved, the nature of the institutions devoted to its study would 
undergo their own shift. As researchers realized the social utility of molecular biology, a push 
toward commercializing research took place, making the field became more competitive for 
patents and profits. While not a commercial research institution itself, CSHL nonetheless has 
positioned itself as a focal point of biotechnology. The modern biotechnology industry, an 
outgrowth of the discovery of recombinant DNA in 1973, has been heavily focused on the 
application of molecular genetics to treating human diseases. The goal has been to develop 
diagnostic tools, drugs, and other therapeutics as treatments for a variety of ailments, particularly 
genetic disorders such as cancer. Though the 1970s saw the rise of companies geared toward 
commercial research and development, there remained a sharp distinction between such 
companies and academic and other basic-research institutions. This distinction gradually blurred 
(though it hasn’t completely disappeared) as it became more acceptable for the two types of 
institutions to collaborate. 
CSHL’s relationship with the biotechnology industry began in 1980, with the formation of 
Cellbiology Corporation, a for-profit company meant to serve as the Laboratory’s “development 
arm.” Ever since, CSHL has maintained close ties with the industry, forging collaborations and 
research agreements with some of the most prominent biotechnology companies in the world: 
Exxon, Monsanto, and Genetics Institute are among the most notable. In addition, the 
Laboratory’s scientists have established many of their own biotechnology companies. The story 
of CSHL’s involvement with this industry is not without its rough spots, including the fears, 
particularly potent during the early 1980s, that business would corrupt the Laboratory’s pristine 
reputation for good science. Like so many other institutions at that time, CSHL had to balance 
concerns about its reputation with the desire to move forward in science.  
Though biotechnology at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory began in earnest during the 1980s, the 
application of biological research to human issues had been a part of the Laboratory, to a limited 
extent, before then. Beginning in 1942, for instance, the Department of Genetics conducted 
government-sponsored research for the United States’s efforts in the Second World War. 
Cooperating with the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Department, the Laboratory studied 
preventing the harmful effects of chemicals and bacteria on soldiers. This research included 
testing hypochlorite on airborne bacteria and conducting experiments with aerosols. The 
scientists also developed plastic nebulizers, both to disperse anti-microbial and anti-chemical 
aerosols into the air and to administer penicillin mist to infected patients. Another significant 
project at the time concerned penicillin. Then still considered a wonder drug, penicillin was in 
high demand during the war years as a treatment for soldiers’ infections. In 1944, on contract 
with the federal Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Carnegie Institute 
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completed a study on bacterial resistance to the drug.1 Milislav Demerec, who had signed on as 
the Carnegie Institute’s director three years earlier, completed further work on penicillin; in 
particular, he was able to create high-yielding penicillium strains using X-rays.2 
 
Recombinant DNA and Academia’s First Steps Toward Biotechnology  
If the era of modern biotechnology had to be fitted with a precise starting point, one could do 
worse than November 1973. That month, a paper appeared in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences authored by Stanley Cohen, Herbert Boyer, Annie Chang, and Robert 
Helling.3 The paper described a method by which a recombinant plasmid could be constructed in 
vitro by joining two fragments of separate plasmids. What’s more, after being inserted into E. 
coli, these recombinant plasmids could operate like fully functional replicons. Though other 
scientists—Paul Berg, for example—had worked on gene-splicing methods before the 
appearance of this particular paper, it was Cohen and Boyer who succeeded in getting the 
recombinant material to replicate inside the bacteria. Thus two decades after the double helix had 
revolutionized biology, the method of recombinant DNA was doing it all over again. The 
implications of the new technology were enormous. If, so the thinking went, the DNA molecule 
could be altered and manipulated at will, it stood to reason that genetic disorders could be 
treated, or even cured, by the proper kinds of alterations. Faulty or missing genes could be 
replaced (in theory) by functioning copies, for instance. This was the hope that recombinant 
DNA inspired among researchers; it served as the premise for a new industry based on using the 
technology to treat human disease. 
Some of the basic tools of recombinant DNA are restriction enzymes, endonucleases that can cut 
the DNA molecule at specific points known as restriction sites. (The fragments are re-joined 
using DNA ligase.) In the early 1970s, the newly discovered enzymes were critical to making 
headway in recombinant DNA research; consequently, the demand for them soared. Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory figures into this history in an interesting way. Richard Roberts, an organic 
chemist, molecular geneticist, and future Nobel laureate, had come to CSHL in September 1972, 
and had become motivated to study restriction enzymes because of the possibility that they could 
be used to sequence DNA. This, Roberts has said, was the “sole reason I became interested in 
restriction enzymes.”4 At the time, while there were ways to sequence RNA, no methods existed 
to sequence DNA, since scientists did not have smaller DNA molecules on which to practice.5 
                                                          
1 Long Island Biological Association, Annual Report of the Biological Laboratory, 1944, 14. 
2 Milislav Demerec, Annual Report of the Director of the Department of Genetics, Carnegie Institution of 
Washington Year Book No. 44, 1944-1945 [issued 1945], 103-108. 
3 Cohen, S.N., Chang, A.C.Y., Boyer, H.W., Helling, R.B., “Construction of Biologically Functional 
Bacterial Plasmids In-Vitro,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 70, 1 November 1973: 3240-3244. 




Seeking to rectify this, Roberts began to use the new technology of agarose slab-gel 
electrophoresis to isolate more restriction enzymes.6 He kept finding more of them, and soon his 
lab became the only one to have a complete set of all known restriction enzymes. Wishing to 
work with these new finds, researchers from all over began to bombard Roberts’s lab with 
requests for specific enzymes. 
It wasn’t long, therefore, before Roberts’s lab became the leading center for restriction-enzyme 
production, with Roberts and his highly skilled technician, Phyllis Meyers, producing large 
amounts for scientists across the United States.7 Roberts also produced enzymes for labs 
overseas, including the Medical Research Council in Cambridge, U.K.8 As the demand rose, 
Roberts saw an opportunity both to make money for CSHL research and to lighten his own lab’s 
workload. In 1974, he approached James Watson and proposed that CSHL begin charging for the 
production of the enzymes. Essentially, it was a proposal to start a for-profit business (at a 
separate lab, off the grounds of CSHL) that would funnel revenues from restriction enzyme 
production and distribution into CSHL research.9 
Watson declined, believing at the time that academic institutions as a whole (though not 
necessarily individual scientists) should avoid involvement with business ventures.10 Watson, in 
retrospect, has said that his decision was a mistake.11 Roberts’s proposal came at a time when 
there was still a serious moral and philosophical barrier between centers of “pure” research like 
CSHL and commercial companies established to make a profit from developing and marketing 
biotechnology. It was not yet considered totally acceptable for the academy to engage in 
commercially oriented research, or even to collaborate with commercial companies on research 
projects. During the 1970s, however, a process began by which this barrier would eventually 
fade into insignificance.  
 
The Changing Face of Academic-Corporate Relationships 
One reason for this was the advent of the cooperative research grant: the funding of research 
projects by corporations. Before then, although it had been common for academic institutions to 
receive corporate money for their scientific research—Cold Spring Harbor, for instance, had 
                                                          
6 Richard J. Roberts, “How restriction enzymes became the workhorses of molecular biology,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, no. 17 (26 April 2005), 5907. 
7 Jim Hicks, Morgan Browne, Bill Keen, and John Maroney, interview with Robert Wargas & Mila 
Pollock, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 11 January 2013; Rich Roberts interview, 12 April 2013. 
8 “How restriction enzymes became the workhorses of molecular biology,” 5907. 
9 Rich Roberts interview, 12 April 2013. 
10 Ibid. 




received grants from companies like I.B.M., Merck, and Pfizer in the 1970s12—the funds took 
the form of general, undirected contributions. These new grants were revolutionary in as much as 
they were corporate funds given to specific researchers for specific projects. The first such grant, 
according to one scholar, came in 1974, when Monsanto agreed to give Harvard Medical School 
$23 million over a twelve-year period for cancer research in the lab of Judah Folkman. An 
arrangement of that nature and magnitude was unheard of at the time; the renowned journal 
Science noted that it was “an agreement that's unprecedented in the annals of academic business 
affairs.”13  
The rest of the 1970s were a transformative period. In 1976, Genentech, the first major genetic-
engineering company, was established. It would eventually earn a stellar reputation for its 
scientists’ role in creating synthetic human insulin, despite the skepticism many academics 
harbored toward market-oriented research. “In 1977 most professors, especially those in biology, 
still had grave doubts regarding the propriety of commercial ties,” wrote Martin Kenney, who 
completed an early but comprehensive study of academic-industrial relations in biotechnology, 
in 1986. These academic scientists “were reluctant to join companies because of peer pressure.” 
Those who did join, moreover, were viewed by their peers with a certain amount of disdain.14 
Jim Hicks remembers that in the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a professional stigma attached 
to full-time research with a commercial company; industry scientists had reputations, whether 
deserved or undeserved, as being less competent than academics. “Anybody who was any good 
in cutting-edge [research] never went to work for a pharmaceutical company in those days,” 
Hicks said in an interview. John Maroney, who for over four decades has been involved in 
technology issues at CSHL, agreed, saying such a career move was viewed as a “demotion.”15 
Such a negative outlook constituted a genuine obstacle to opening a thriving business, since, 
according to Kenney, “in the late 1970s the formation of a genetic engineering company nearly 
always involved an entrepreneur soliciting various professors until he discovered one who was 
interested in forming a company.”16 This did not stop chemical and pharmaceutical companies, 
two pillars of industry, from recognizing, and seizing on, opportunities to expand into 
biotechnology. Before then, chemical companies like DuPont and Monsanto had remained 
entirely separate in their mission from pharmaceutical companies like Merck. With the discovery 
of genetic engineering, a potentially lucrative new business niche induced chemical companies to 
shift their traditional focus to smaller molecules.17 
 
                                                          
12 See CSHL Archives, James D. Watson Collection (hereafter “Watson Collection”), 3/7/3, box 2. 
13 Martin Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986), 58. 
14 Ibid., 96, 100. 
15 Jim Hicks et. al. interview, 11 January 2013. 
16 Kenney, 136-137. 




A Shift in the Zeitgeist for CSHL 
For the rest of the decade, however, CSHL as an institution remained largely removed from the 
blooming new world of commercial science. This did not mean that certain individual scientists 
stayed away completely. After failing to win over James Watson with his idea to market 
restriction enzymes, Rich Roberts began to collaborate with Don Comb, an entrepreneur who 
had started a company called New England Biolabs in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Comb was 
interested in selling restriction enzymes, and Roberts agreed to be his company’s chief 
consultant. After signing on with Comb, Roberts said that he and Watson no longer spoke 
about.18 Watson, in retrospect, said he didn’t mind that Roberts was involved with an outside 
company; he saw no point in trying to stop him.19 
It wasn’t until 1980 that CSHL got serious about biotechnology. In January of that year, Watson 
reported to the Laboratory’s Executive Committee that different venture-capital companies had 
approached the institution proposing to develop some of the CSHL’s research. The Executive 
Committee vigorously discussed such proposals but failed to reach a consensus.20 This, 
according to the extant documentary record, appears to be one of the earliest mentions of 
commercially oriented research among CSHL administrators. This record is unclear about 
exactly when Watson and others at CSHL decided to consider biotechnology as a new route for 
the Laboratory, or why and when their views toward the industry evolved. Watson’s views in 
particular are interesting for their apparent ambivalence, at least around 1980. In one respect, he 
was willing to consider some form of relationship with industry; in another respect, he was, 
owing to the unprecedented nature of such relationships at Cold Spring Harbor, cautious about 
proceeding.  
Nevertheless, there were several reasons for the desire to move closer to the commercial world, 
and the fact that some of these reasons were out of administrators’ hands may explain the 
conflicting views. For instance, as several CSHL alumni have acknowledged, there was a 
pressure to keep up with trends. As mentioned above, a discernible shift had taken place in the 
biological sciences, the effect of which was to narrow the gap between basic and applied 
research. In order for CSHL to maintain its leadership position in molecular biology, then, a 
certain acquiescence to this trend was necessary. There was also a lingering anxiety over 
revenue. Throughout the 1970s, the Lab had relied on the Cancer Center grant, the result of its 
designation as one of a few prestigious designated cancer centers in the United States, as an 
important funding source. CSHL had received the first five-year Cancer Research Center grant 
from the National Cancer Institute in January 1972. The resulting research had focused on using 
                                                          
18 Rich Roberts interview, 12 April 2013. 
19 James Watson interview, 13 May 2013. 
20 Executive Committee Meeting, 22 February 1980, CSHL Archives, Norton Zinder Collection (hereafter 
“Zinder Collection”), box 130. 
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tumor viruses (e.g. adenovirus, polyoma, and SV40) to study mammalian cell transformation. 
According to Guenter Albrecht-Buehler, a CSHL staff scientist from 1974 to 1982,21 sometime 
near the end of the 1970s, the NIH attempted to push the Lab away from the focus on the 
genetics of cell transformation and toward a focus on cell biology.22  
The pressure from the NIH meant that Watson, in Buehler’s view, “had to consider shifting the 
focus of the Lab to cell biology, and it was obvious to me that he felt extremely uncomfortable 
about it.” Watson was explicit about his reluctance to do this, since a shift in focus would mean a 
move away from what Buehler said were the more “profound visions” of molecular genetics. 
Buehler recalls conversations with Watson in which these concerns were explicit. “Still, in view 
of the pressure of the NIH,” Buehler said, “something had to be done in order to secure the future 
funding, and among others, commercialization of the Lab’s research offered itself to Jim as a 
possible source of future funding.”23 
William Udry, who was the Administrative Director of the Laboratory from 1971 to 1984, has 
agreed that although CSHL had overcome the dire financial situation it had faced in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, it was still in “somewhat poor shape financially” in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Despite the financial cushion provided by the Robertson Research Fund, established in 
1973, the Laboratory still needed other sources of revenue. “We were always interested in 
money,” Udry said. “I got involved pretty early in talking to businesses.” Though business-
oriented research in general seemed inevitable, the exact nature of that new path remained 
unclear. A relevant question was what CSHL should do about potentially profitable research 
results coming out of its laboratories.24 Should they market them? Should they collaborate with 
other companies? Should they seek to open a for-profit biotechnology company, as scientists like 
Walter Gilbert and Herbert Boyer had done?25 
These questions coincided with the conflict still raging in molecular biology over whether the 
profit motive was an honorable one for a university to pursue. In some cases biotechnology 
ended up a casualty of academic skepticism. In 1980, for example, Harvard tried to start its own 
genetic-engineering company. Similar to what CSHL would end up proposing, Harvard 
administrators envisioned a university-affiliated company that would market Harvard professors’ 
research. The idea backfired. There was a tremendous negative reaction to the concept of a 
university-industry nexus. In fact, the entirety of Cambridge civil society seemed to rebel against 
it; reactions came from Harvard faculty, the media, and the surrounding community.26 The 
                                                          
21 http://www.basic.northwestern.edu/g-buehler/cv.htm. Accessed 15 May 2013. 
22 Guenter Albrecht-Buehler, email to Robert Wargas, 9 November 2012. 
23 Ibid. 
24 William Udry, phone interview with Robert Wargas, 4 December 2012. 
25 Bayard Clarkson, a former trustee, agreed that the Lab was still financially unsure of itself circa 1980, 
and that biotech offered itself as a possible solution to this. Bayard Clarkson, phone interview with Robert 
Wargas, 28 November 2012. 
26 Kenney, Biotechnology, 78-79. 
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controversy was not contained to Massachusetts. One morning—October 27, 1980—Derek Bok, 
the president of Harvard, woke to see his face on the front page of the New York Times. The 
report concerned the university’s proposed genetic-engineering company. “During the weeks that 
followed,” Bok wrote two years later, reflecting on the incident, “articles appeared in dozens of 
newspapers and magazines debating the merits and demerits of entering into commercial 
ventures of this kind. Scientists and editorial writers quickly volunteered their own opinions, 
most of them hostile.”27 
By the middle of 1980, Watson and CSHL administrators were in the middle of their own 
negotiations regarding a proposed British company called Celltech. Originally intended to be a 
collaboration between CSHL, the Medical Research Council Laboratory of the University of 
Cambridge, and the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, it was set up with capital from the U.K. 
National Enterprise Board, among other sources.28 CSHL was serious about joining. In June 
1980 Watson and other administrators headed to England to meet with those involved in the 
venture.29 Ultimately, though, Watson decided not to go ahead with the collaboration; the idea 
was, in his words at the time, to “go it alone and form our own company,” which CSHL 
administrators had already been discussing since the beginning of 1980.30 This solo idea was 
Cellbiology Corporation, which was envisioned as the Laboratory’s own for-profit 
biotechnology company.  
After nearly a year of discussion among the trustees, Cellbiology was incorporated in November 
1980.31 At the end of the 1981 annual report, Watson announced that the company had been 
created “to help respond to any such [commercial] opportunities if they arise….”32 The decision 
was an important one and was not without its detractors. These were still the early days of the 
academic-commercial crossover; certain scientists and trustees worried that business 
relationships would only erode the integrity and quality of science. They worried, for instance, 
that researchers would become too concerned with profits, and that a culture of secrecy would 
develop among researchers collaborating with different corporations. Despite these difficult 
questions and the skepticism that surrounded them, the legal and political climates in 1980 were 
shifting in biotechnology’s favor. Two developments in particular stand out above the rest. The 
first was a United States Supreme Court decision of June 16, 1980, in the case of Diamond v. 
                                                          
27 “Harvard Considers Commercial Role in DNA Research,” New York Times, 27 October 1980, A1; 
Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern University (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 136. 
28 “One way ahead for British biotechnology,” Nature, vol. 285, 5 June 1980; “British biotechnology boat 
comes home,” Nature, vol. 286, 24 July 1980. 
29 Memorandum, William Udry to Committee on Commercial Relations of the Laboratory, 9 June 1980, 
Zinder Collection, box 130. 
30 James Watson to G.H. Fairtlough, 17 September 1980, Zinder Collection, box 130. 
31 Certificate of Incorporation of Cellbiology Corporation, 20 November 1980, Cellbiology Corporation 
document binder, CSHL Archives. 
32 CSHL Annual Report 1981, 16. It should be noted that although Cellbiology was created in 1980, it 
essentially lay dormant for a while before business began.  
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Chakrabarty.33 The case concerned a microbiologist named Ananda Chakrabarty, who while 
working for General Electric had engineered a bacterium that could ameliorate oil spills by 
breaking down the crude oil itself. In 1972, Chakrabarty had filed a patent application for the 
invention that included the process for making the bacterium as well as the engineered organism 
itself. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denied the patent, arguing that living organisms 
could not be patented according to U.S. law. 
The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled, in a five-to-four decision on June 
16, 1980, that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is eligible for a patent.34 The 
landmark decision came under some significant criticism. Harold J. Morowitz, the renowned 
biophysicist, wrote in the New York Times that the “radical” decision was “simple reductionism” 
that refused “to draw a sharp distinction between animate and inanimate matter.” He referred to 
this as “reducing life to physics.”35 Another group, calling itself the “People’s Business 
Commission,” invoked dystopian literature and wrote that “the Brave New World that Aldous 
Huxley warned of is now here.”36 
In reality, the decision was part of the same cultural shift in which Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory and other institutions found themselves. Governments—local, state, and federal—
were responding to the demands and requirements of a new industry. In December 1980, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which created a uniform patent policy for all federal 
agencies that fund research. The legislation also allowed universities and non-profit research 
institutions that received federal funding to own the inventions arising from their funded 
research. (Previously, the U.S. government took title to all such inventions.) These two decisions 
made the field of biotechnology even more attractive for academic institutions, including CSHL; 
not wishing to be left behind, the Lab positioned itself to assume a prominent role.37 
 
Cellbiology Corporation and CSHL’s Transition into Biotechnology  
It is not entirely clear from the documentary record who came up with the idea for Cellbiology. 
Sambrook, in a 2013 interview, was confident that it was Watson’s idea. Ironically, both Watson 
and John Maroney, who had worked closely with Udry and became the Lab’s assistant 
administrative director in 1982, had guessed that it was Joe Sambrook’s initiative.38 Sambrook 
                                                          
33 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
34 Douglas Robinson and Nina Medlock, “Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A Retrospective on 25 Years of 
Biotech Patents,” Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 17, no. 10 (October 2005), 12. 
35 Harold J. Morowitz, “Reducing Life to Physics,” New York Times, 23 June 1980. 
36 “Science May Patent New Forms of Life, Justices Rule, 5 to 4,” New York Times, 17 June 1980. 
37 John Maroney interview, 28 September 2012. 
38 James Watson, interview by Robert Wargas & Mila Pollock, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 13 May 
2013; John Maroney interview, 28 September 2012. 
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denied this, saying that he, like many others, wasn’t “terribly keen about it.”39 Hired to study 
tumor viruses, Sambrook became a leading figure at the Laboratory, assuming the positions of 
Assistant Director from 1977 to 1985 and Acting Director from mid-1983 to mid-1984, the latter 
position filled while Watson was on sabbatical. Both men maintained a close working 
relationship, talking “all the time,” according to Watson; he credits Sambrook as a motivating 
force at the Laboratory.40 
William Udry kept an extensive journal record of his time at CSHL. He noted that, at a private 
meeting on February 12, 1980, Watson wanted CSHL’s commercial activities restricted to 
monoclonal antibodies. Though the Laboratory would soon embrace the idea of establishing its 
own for-profit biotechnology company, Watson harbored negative feelings toward such a move. 
Udry’s journals, for example, reveal that Watson thought involvement with technology 
companies “would ruin the Lab” despite their profitability.41 Joe Sambrook, however, recalled 
that when it came to commercialization, Watson was “for it.”42 It is unclear how, why, or when 
Watson’s views evolved—although he has maintained, as of 2013, that he was always supportive 
of commercialization, saying he wanted to see science “incentivized” at CSHL.43 Sambrook, 
however, remembers that it was “a very difficult time for all of us,” that  “we all had 
reservations” about establishing a business: the prospect of having “mixed financial 
arrangements”—that is, the inherent conflict of simultaneously running a non-profit and for-
profit enterprise—worried Sambrook and others.44 
The same concerns that had foreclosed on Harvard’s plan for a biotech company seeped into the 
discussion at Cold Spring Harbor. The more traditional academic scientists viewed themselves as 
having the “pure” motive of understanding the nature of life, not the profit motive of 
entrepreneurs. The highest priority for Trustees and scientists, whatever their opinion on 
biotechnology, was preserving CSHL’s academic integrity. In 1980, during the planning stages 
for Cellbiology Corporation, Lab administrators felt that there were three general ways in which 
CSHL could initiate itself into the commercial world: (1) an outside company could fund the 
Lab's research via grants or contracts; (2) the Lab's licensing its research results to a company in 
exchange for royalties; and (3) the Lab becoming involved in actually running or helping to run a 
commercial entity. Dr. Harry Eagle, a trustee, noted that the first two options were relatively 
non-controversial; the third, however, was the one that was most likely to generate controversy.45 
                                                          
39 Joe Sambrook  and  Mary-Jane Gething, phone interview with Robert Wargas & Mila Pollock, 14 June 
2013. 
40 James Watson interview, 13 May 2013. 
41 William Udry, phone interview with Robert Wargas, 4 December 2012. It’s important to note that the 
quote from Udry’s diary was his own recollection of what Watson said. 
42 Joe Sambrook (with Mary-Jane Gething), phone interview with Robert Wargas & Mila Pollock, 14 
June 2013. 
43 James Watson interview, 13 May 2013. 
44 Joe Sambrook and Mary-Jane Gething interview, 14 June 2013. 
45 Executive Committee Meeting, 18 April 1980, Zinder Collection, box 130. 
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Still, it was the third option that the Lab chose. Cellbiology was planned as the for-profit “arm” 
of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, a developmental clearinghouse, as it were, through which the 
staff’s potentially lucrative research results could be developed and marketed.46 The Lab was not 
merely seeking commercial grants; it was seeking to open a bona fide business. This upset 
certain people. The Board of Trustees met on April 19, 1980, and discussed business possibilities 
at length. Their caution was reflected in the minutes of that meeting. For example, “several 
scientists/trustees pointed out that once a retainer-like relationship was established with industry, 
it was an irrevocable step and would in the natural course of events lead to some direction for a 
scientist to look for things of interest to the outside corporation.”47  
Such attitudes were common at the time, at CSHL and elsewhere. The fear was that corporations 
would begin to exert influence and pressure on the research institutions with which they 
collaborated; moreover, as different scientists at the same institution picked up contracts from 
competing corporations, an atmosphere of secrecy could develop that would impede 
collaboration among researchers. Whereas a relatively open culture among scientists had existed 
previously, administrators feared an irrevocable shift would take place that would destroy the 
friendly atmosphere in which good science had taken place. 
 
Tissue Plasminogen Activator 
Cellbiology’s first (and, it turns out, only48) major project concerned developing a recombinant 
form of tissue plasminogen activator (TPA), a protein that aids in dissolving blood clots. 
According to Angus McIntyre, Cellbiology’s responsibilities included the identification of the 
TPA gene sequence clones, the expression of that gene in E. coli to synthesize a large yield of 
TPA, the isolation of the synthesized molecules, and the creation of a purification system.49 
Working with Baxter Travenol Laboratories,50 Cellbiology recruited several scientists to work on 
the project, including Mary-Jane Gething, a protein chemist from the UK. Cellbiology also 
partnered with Genetics Institute, which was then a relatively new company in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. It turned out that Cellbiology would have to compete with Genentech. Since 
                                                          
46 Outline of Protocol, 13 October 1981, CSHL Archives, Office of Technology Transfer files, boxes 1 
and 2. This document proclaims CSHL’s “intention…to make Cellbiology Corp. its commercial arm.” 
Part of this plan involved Cellbiology’s paying CSHL five percent of its gross income, though it is 
unclear whether this percentage was adhered to. 
47 Minutes of the 50th Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 19 April 1980, Zinder Collection, box 130. 
48 Cellbiology had planned to make the marketing of monoclonal antibodies a central part of its business, 
but while CSHL itself did get involved with monoclonals, it doesn’t appear to have been through 
Cellbiology. Also, Cellbiology did complete a study for Southern Pacific Petroleum on “the use of 
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early on in the project, there had been rumors that Genentech had already found a clone for TPA. 
Joe Sambrook reminded everyone that finding a clone was only one step in a long, complex 
process of development and marketing. Moreover, Angus McIntyre anticipated that Cellbiology 
and Genentech would end up using different processes to produce TPA—which would mean 
separate patents.51  
The idea to work on TPA grew out of meetings Jim Watson had attended in Japan for the Asian 
Molecular Biology Organization (AMBO) around 1980.52 According to Sambrook, Watson came 
back to CSHL excited about the possibilities of developing urokinase, an enzyme produced by 
the kidneys (and found in urine) that can aid in dissolving blood clots.53 After Dan Rifkin of 
New York University, however, suggested that TPA was a better protein, a friend of Watson’s 
named Roger Sammit put Watson in contact with Vernon Loucks, the CEO of Baxter Travenol. 
Sammit was crucial in arranging the initial meeting, which developed into a business relationship 
when Watson was able to sell the idea of developing TPA for the drug market.54 
Unfortunately, the news of Genentech’s successful cloning of TPA was out by the summer of 
1982. Though it would take Cellbiology scientists another several months to get their own clone, 
Loucks hoped that Baxter Travenol would be able to “beat them [Genentech] to the 
marketplace.”55 Mary-Jane Gething recalls that “we were obviously disappointed, but the fact is 
we weren’t surprised.” Genentech had been working feverishly on TPA. (Susan Bonitz, a 
biologist who would later come to CSHL as part of its collaboration Exxon, recalls that, as a 
post-doc at Genentech, she could see Dave Goeddel working on TPA constantly in his office 
down the hall.56) Gething attributes Genentech’s triumph to the fact that they had more full-time 
scientists working on it. Some friction and competition with Genetics Institute may have also 
slowed Cellbiology’s work down.57 
In the summer of 1984, Baxter sold its interests in TPA to Burroughs Welcome. By that time (as 
early as 1982, in fact) CSHL administrators had already considered shutting down Cellbiology, 
as the TPA project was the only job it was working on. Though the company was not officially 
dissolved until 1995,58 Cellbiology lay dormant after its work on TPA had been completed. 
Cellbiology’s short life-span has been attributed to several things. John Maroney believes the 
company was inherently flawed from a business standpoint: “clearinghouse”-type companies, in 
which an academic institution funnels marketable research through a biotechnology “arm,” have 
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not done well in the past. Jim Hicks agreed, saying such companies try “to serve too many 
masters.”59 Financial problems, especially with capitalization, inevitably follow. Sambrook has 
said that Cellbiology was “destined to fail” because a proper funding scheme was never worked 
out. He also believes that the failure to secure a separate laboratory building for research—CSHL 
had entertained purchasing an empty school building for Cellbiology, but the deal was never 
completed—helped doom the corporation. 
 
The Exxon Deal: A Watershed Moment in Commercial Collaboration 
Despite Cellbiology’s failure to become a long-term concern, CSHL stayed committed to new 
commercial ties. The next milestone came in 1982: a collaboration with the Exxon Research and 
Engineering Company. Sensing the trends at the time, Exxon had thought it a good idea to move 
in the direction of molecular biology and biotechnology. Their plan was to contribute funding to 
CSHL’s research in exchange for the training of Exxon scientists in biological techniques, 
specifically recombinant DNA. For CSHL, the Exxon deal represented the first major injection 
of corporate money into the Laboratory; it was also the first time the Lab undertook training 
scientists from a commercial company. (For these reasons the deal was mildly controversial.) 
Exxon’s interest in CSHL had been spurred by the former’s interest in the genetic engineering of 
enzymes.  
While Exxon had engaged in microbiological research, it had yet to develop advanced capacity 
in molecular biology; the collaboration was thus Exxon's attempt to initiate itself into that field. 
Exxon even had a $750-million research facility in New Jersey in the works for this new research 
direction.60 The collaboration program called for CSHL to train six carefully selected Exxon 
scientists in the methods of genetic engineering. By the end of 1982, Susan Bonitz and Steve 
Hinton, two Exxon scientists, had begun research at CSHL. The Lab had also recruited several 
new staff members of its own who would work with the Exxon scientists, including Mark Zoller 
for site-specific mutagenesis and Fevzi Daldal for anaerobic genetics.61 Though it is unclear who 
initially approached whom with the idea for this collaboration, Watson coordinated with Edward 
David, who was then president of Exxon Research and Engineering; the specifics of the deal 
were negotiated by William Udry, whom several senior people at CSHL have given credit for the 
final agreement.62 
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The collaboration was indeed a fruitful one for CSHL, which was able to secure ample funding 
in exchange for little overhead or obligation. For James Watson, the deal grew out of “the 
imperative to radically expand our facilities for protein chemistry at the micro level…. But we 
saw no immediate way to obtain the funds to add the new space to Demerec, our laboratory best 
suited for such work.”63 Underlying the Exxon deal, however, was the same trepidation that had 
found its way into the debate over Cellbiology. There was still discomfort over how increasing 
involvement in biotechnology might adversely affect the Laboratory. Since CSHL hadn't yet 
undertaken a major collaborative project with a commercial entity, some administrators urged 
that the Lab take a more conservative approach; they were, for instance, apprehensive that such a 
project would fundamentally change the nature of the Lab.  
An outspoken skeptic of CSHL's new industry-oriented approach in general, and of the Exxon 
deal in particular, was Norton Zinder, a renowned scientist and trustee. In an Executive 
Committee Meeting in February 1982, Zinder worried that the Lab was becoming too cozy with 
the commercial aspects of biotech and warned that the agreement with Exxon–indeed, any 
agreement with a business–would drastically change the way the Lab operated. He even put 
forward the view that good science was completely incompatible with the goals and methods of a 
corporation.64 Susan Bonitz, the Exxon scientist who worked in the Delbruck Laboratory,65 
remembers that “there were a lot of people who were pretty suspicious about getting this 
collaboration started,” mainly because Exxon was a large corporation (and an oil company to 
boot), which some at CSHL still regarded as a corrupting force. Nevertheless, Bonitz also 
remembers a noticeable excitement from others at the Laboratory who were interested in seeing 
the deal work.66 
The Exxon collaboration, unfortunately, did not lead to any research milestones for either 
institution. In fact, things ended prematurely: Bonitz has said that her work in mitochondrial 
DNA was cut short when she was informed by Watson, sometime around 1984 or so, that her 
time at CSHL was ending.67 Watson, speaking in a 2013 interview, said that Exxon had 
depended on stable oil prices to help finance their entry into molecular biology, and when the 
price of oil dropped significantly in the early and mid-1980s,68 their plans to move forward were 
stymied.69 Though Exxon’s research presence at CSHL eventually dwindled, they met their 
contractual obligations to fund CSHL, and this money was enough for CSHL to help finance its 
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own expansion. This included an addition to Demerec Laboratory. Watson has also said that the 
Exxon money was necessary for CSHL to fund research in plant genetics as well.70  
 
CSHL Scientists Become More Involved in Biotechnology 
Cold Spring Harbor’s relationship with biotechnology has included not just collaboration with 
outside corporations but the entrepreneurship of its own scientists in establishing their own 
companies. The first such company, Protein Databases Inc. (PDI), officially began business 
operations in 1984, although the planning and start-up of the company went back several years. 
PDI was based on work in 2D gel electrophoresis by two scientists, Robert Franza and Jim 
Garrels. Franza came to CSHL in July 1982 for the specific reason of working with Garrels. He 
and Garrels had discussed the potential marketing of the latter’s work in 2D gel technology.71 
The goal was not so much to make money as to ensure that the technology was widely available 
to other researchers.72 In July 1983, the two scientists began to look for venture capital. One 
company that expressed interest was the major Manhattan firm Alan Patricof Associates, Inc.73 
Franza, a year earlier, had been introduced to Alan Patricof, who then introduced Franza to Alan 
Schwartz of Bear Stearns, with whom Franza became friendly. Bear Sterns agreed to capitalize 
Protein Databases, Inc., with $1 million, which Franza said was quite a lot of money at the time, 
especially for a young, unproven company in a new field. However, Franza stressed the 
importance of Jim Watson’s support for the new company it getting started.74  
Biotechnology was gaining momentum on Long Island. In the early 1980s, three areas of the 
United States had cemented their reputations as important focal points of the industry: California, 
Massachusetts, and North Carolina.75 New York, especially Long Island, was becoming part of 
the conversation, however. Both New York State and Nassau County had approved millions of 
dollars’ worth of grants and bond issues for technology development in the early part of the 
decade.76 The idea was simply to attract as much scientific entrepreneurship as possible. CSHL 
administrators were keenly aware of this new business activity going on around them. In March 
1983, for instance, Watson informed the Executive Committee of a new company that was in the 
works that would focus on developing cancer therapies.77  
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This company was to be called Oncogene Science, Inc. (later known as “OSI”), and it was to be 
spearheaded by Gary Takata and John Stephenson, the latter of whom had been a researcher at 
the National Cancer Institute. The company took its name from a popular research focus in 
molecular biology at the time: cancer-causing genes, known more colloquially as “oncogenes.” 
Mike Wigler stood as an important figure in this area of research. In 1981, he and his team had 
isolated the first human oncogene from bladder cancer and were able to create cancer in a 
healthy mouse cell with the gene. Representatives of Oncogene Science approached Mitch 
Goldfarb, a scientist in Wigler’s lab, about their idea to establish a company based on oncogene 
research.78 Wigler was offered a consultancy with the company. Watson also figured into the 
company’s strategy; seeking the names of established scientists, the founders considered making 
him an administrator in the company, or at least offering him some kind of consultancy.79 
Watson eventually decided against any kind of authoritative role in the company, becoming a 
member of the scientific advisory board instead.80  
Oncogene Science’s location was the subject of some dispute. The founders of the company had 
originally wanted it to be located in New Jersey, but Watson pushed for a spot closer to Cold 
Spring Harbor, and refused to get involved unless his demand was met.81 (The founders 
ostensibly relented; Oncogene Science ended up settling in Mineola.) Owing to the company’s 
proximity to CSHL, Norton Zinder worried that Oncogene Science constituted a conflict of 
interest for the Lab, or at least gave the appearance of one. Sambrook, too, advised that the Lab 
not become too involved with the new company for the same reason. Watson responded by 
saying that he wanted to promote Long Island's biotechnology industry, and that having a 
company nearby would mean the possibility of consulting with its staff.82  
In light of Watson’s response, it is not surprising that Cold Spring Harbor continued to deepen its 
involvement in commercial science for the rest of the 1980s. By 1983, CSHL administrators had 
already “moved from the basic challenges of ‘should we’ to ‘how do we best’ handle such 
[commercial] relationships.”83 That year, the Board of Trustees created a Commercial Relations 
Committee, whose purpose was to review all proposed arrangements between CSHL and the 
industrial world84 and to guard against conflicts of interest. The committee would benefit from 
the counsel and guidance of important Laboratory scientists, such as Rich Roberts and Bruce 
Stillman, both of whom continued to assume greater responsibilities. Roberts would become 
Assistant Director for Research in 1986, shortly after Sambrook’s departure for the University of 
Texas Southwest Medical Center. Stillman, who had come to the Lab in 1979 as a post-doctoral 
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researcher, began solidifying a reputation as an effective leader in the 1980s. John Maroney 
recalls that though Stillman himself was not involved in biotechnology, he became a powerful 
voice on the Commercial Relations Committee.85 Stillman would become Assistant Director of 
the Laboratory in 1990 and succeed Watson as director in 1994. 
In addition to the Exxon deal, the 1980s saw other lucrative corporate collaborations for CSHL. 
One was a research-support relationship with Amersham, a British pharmaceutical company, to 
support Ed Harlow’s work at CSHL in monoclonal antibodies.86 Another major deal was a five-
year, $2.1 million agreement with Monsanto to study mouse genetics, specifically gene transfer 
and gene expression in mammalian development.87 This was followed by a five-year, $2.5 
million deal with Pioneer Hi-Bred International, signed in August 1985. This latter deal 
concerned Pioneer’s supporting CSHL’s research in the use of recombinant DNA techniques on 
maize, with the agreement that Pioneer would get the license on whatever technology came out 
of the program.  
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory had not yet done much by way of patenting. The institution’s 
first patent had been granted in 1977, for Bruce Detroy’s two-dimensional gel boxes.88 It was 
Mike Wigler, however, who would bring CSHL its first taste of significant patent royalties. 
Before coming to CSHL, Wigler had completed his doctorate at Columbia University, working 
with Richard Axel. There, along with Saul Silverstein, they had developed important methods 
known as cotransformation and coamplification. These were essentially eukaryotic analogues of 
recombinant DNA, a method restricted to prokaryotes. One study put it succinctly: “the process 
[cotransformation] allowed the incorporation of any known gene, prokaryotic or eukaryotic, into 
any mammalian cell.” The more colloquial term for the technology is “the Wigler Method,” 
since the whole idea is generally recognized as Wigler’s.89 The method’s novelty involves 
inserting two genes into a cell. The first codes for a desirable protein product, the second for a 
substance (i.e. a marker) that will help to identify those cells that have acquired the inserted 
genes. For instance, in addition to a gene coding for the desired product, a gene for a substance 
resistant to a particular toxin may also be introduced. Afterwards, the treated cells are exposed to 
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that toxin. Only the cells that have successfully incorporated the foreign DNA into its genome 
will survive.90 
A patent for the method was filed on February 25, 1980.91 In an interview on the topic, Wigler 
said it was Axel who had suggested patenting cotransformation, which, to Wigler, was “a rather 
odd thing to do” at the time—a good reminder that patenting was not on many scientists’ minds 
during that era of science.92 Though important parts of the cotransformation experiments had 
been done by Wigler while at CSHL—he began working there in 1978—the Lab did not begin 
receiving royalties on the patents until much later. In the mid-1980s, Wigler mentioned to Jim 
Watson that CSHL could secure some of the royalties. It would take several more years until 
John Maroney could negotiate a deal with Columbia for five percent of the patent revenues.93 
According to William Keen, who was CSHL’s comptroller from 1971 to 2011, this deal would 
bring the Laboratory at least $1 million a year over ten years.94 
 
Preparing for the Second Century  
The increased involvement with biotechnology in the 1980s meant the need to expand the 
Laboratory itself. There had been talk at CSHL at least as early as 1984 about instituting a major 
capital fundraising program, the impetus for which was the realization that the Lab had no 
comprehensive fundraising strategy in place. In November 1984, for instance, the Board of 
Trustees noted: “Past fundraising has been a reflexive, knee-jerk response to pressures for 
expansion. We have been so perpetually involved in present crises that we never had enough 
time to plan comprehensively for the future.”95  
The Lab’s administrators envisioned a continuous fundraising program based on sponsorship 
from corporations and charities. Similar proposals had been made in the past, but none had been 
implemented.96 What came out of this idea would become known as the Second Century 
campaign, so named because 1990 would mark CSHL’s 100th anniversary. The goal of the 
campaign was to keep CSHL in its place as a leader in the biological sciences by ensuring that 
the Lab’s plant and equipment were up to date. It also meant making sure the Lab took chances 
                                                          
90 Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 126 F.Supp.2d 16 (2000), No. 93-11512-
NG, United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, 11 December 2000. 
91 Colaianni, “The Axel Patents: A Case Study in University Technology Transfer,” 3. 
92 Ibid., 8. 
93 John Maroney, interview by Robert Wargas, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 3 July 2012; Morgan 
Browne, Jim Hicks, Bill Keen, John Maroney, interview by Robert Wargas & Mila Pollock, Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory, 11 January 2013. 
94 Bill Keen, interview by Robert Wargas, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 6 August 2012. 
95 “A Preliminary Plan for a Second Century Campaign, 1985-1990,” Board of Trustees Meeting, 10 
November 1984, Zinder Collection, box 129. 
96 Retrospectus 1983, Zinder Collection, box 129; Morgan Browne, interview by Robert Wargas, Cold 
Spring Harbor Laboratory, 27 June 2012. 
19 
 
on up-and-coming areas of science. Toward this end, a centerpiece of the program was a plan to 
build a large neuroscience center on Laboratory grounds. CSHL had been involved in teaching 
and researching neurobiology since 1974,97 mostly in annual summer courses, but it had not yet 
integrated the study of the brain into its full-time research focus. At least as early as 1983, CSHL 
administrators wondered whether the Laboratory needed a new building to house a year-round 
neurobiology program.98 
The biological sciences had grown significantly since Watson and Crick’s discovery of the 
double helix. They had grown even more so since genetic engineering had become a reality the 
previous decade. By 1983, molecular biology had created synthetic human insulin, made more 
connections between genes and cancer, and important discoveries had been made concerning the 
AIDS virus. In this last endeavor, CSHL had played its own important role, hosting an important 
conference of AIDS researchers in September 1983 at which Luc Montagnier first publicly 
announced the discovery of the virus.99 
Neuroscience remained a relatively barren frontier. Unraveling the mysteries of the brain was as 
fresh as research on tumor viruses had been fifteen years earlier. It was the area of science to 
which Francis Crick had turned after molecular genetics, and it held promise in both basic 
science and biotechnology. According to Morgan Browne, who was Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory’s Administrative Director from 1985 to 2000, the neuroscience center was entirely 
Watson’s idea.100 Since it would constitute the largest expansion of the Laboratory in its history 
up until that time, the idea was not without its detractors, who thought Cold Spring Harbor might 
become too big for its own good.101 
But the Lab’s administrators were not just concerned with building for building’s sake. With the 
commercial science industry growing, Cold Spring Harbor needed to become a more attractive 
place for young scientists to work.102 This stemmed from the worry that private industry was 
becoming more lucrative for molecular biologists in general, and that it might continue to attract 
talent away from universities and non-profit research institutions. Cold Spring Harbor itself 
suffered from its reputation as a place at which traditional tenure appointments were not offered. 
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The closest thing to such a tenured position was the Laboratory’s “rolling five” appointment, in 
which a scientist was granted continuous five-year research- and salary-support commitments.103 
The financial goals of the Second Century campaign included raising $44 million for capital 
projects. Despite Cold Spring Harbor’s prominence, the Second Century Campaign was 
unprecedented in the scope of its goals. Watson’s financing strategy was to approach “the major 
international pharmaceutical and biotechnological corporations who benefit from the Lab's 
existence" in order to secure funding.104 
With the proposed neuroscience center as its centerpiece, CSHL sought major donations from 
major organizations. In this it was undoubtedly successful. In October 1987, for instance, it was 
announced that the Laboratory had received $7 million from the Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute, $5 million of which would be put toward construction of the neuroscience center. It 
was at the time the largest foundation grant the Laboratory had ever received.105 In December, 
the chemist and philanthropist Arnold Beckman, founder of the Arnold and Mabel Beckman 
Foundation, told Watson that, thanks to Black Monday, the weakened economy made donations 
difficult. Nevertheless, Watson persisted. In February 1988, it was announced that Beckman had 
decided to contribute $4 million toward the project. The legacy of this contribution is the naming 
of the neuroscience laboratory after Beckman and his wife.106  
By July 1988, the Lab had raised $15 million for the neuroscience center through Beckman and 
other foundations. Nevertheless, Watson wrote at the time that he viewed funding for the project 
as “the real complication of my existence.” At the time, the center was projected to cost $20 
million, and there was still significant funding that needed to be secured. That month brought 
good news, however, when the Dolan Family Foundation—Helen Dolan was a CSHL trustee at 
the time—announced that they would provide $2 million toward the residence hall component of 
the project.107 
Despite the success of the fundraising campaign, CSHL had to watch as another potential source 
of revenue slipped away. An international dispute had developed over who had the right to 
market the recombinant form of TPA, which CSHL had worked on earlier in the decade. 
Genentech had filed lawsuits all over the world against companies they alleged were infringing 
on their patents. One such lawsuit was against the Wellcome Foundation, to which Baxter 
Travenol had sold its interests in TPA. In July 1987, Genentech lost its case against Wellcome 
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when the London High Court of Justice rules that its British patent was too broad; Wellcome had 
defended itself by arguing against the “obviousness” of Genentech’s cloning technique.108  
In November, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced it would approve TPA after a 
long dispute over the drug’s safety.109 The following year, in June 1988, the New York Times 
reported that Genentech “had received a broad patent for purified” TPA.110 The legal 
complexities involved with patenting TPA included the fact that, as the Times put it, “TPA is a 
naturally occurring human protein that can be imitated in scores of slightly different ways.”111 
Though Genentech had lost its British patent, it continued to fight to maintain its market share in 
the United States, even as other companies, such as Biogen and Monsanto, had received patents 
for their own versions of TPA.112 Genentech’s version, which the company called “Activase,” 
was expected to bring in as much as $200 million in sales revenue that year alone.113 In fact, only 
five months after getting FDA approval to market TPA, the company had already seen $100 
million in sales.114 A U.S. District Court ruled finally ruled in April 1990 that all of Genentech’s 
American patents on TPA were valid, effectively barring Burroughs Wellcome and Genetics 
Institute from selling the drug.115 Nevertheless, TPA’s reputation had already been dealt a blow 
the previous year, in March 1989, when a study in The New England Journal of Medicine 
concluded that there was no difference in effectiveness between TPA and streptokinase, a much 
cheaper drug.116 This study eventually damaged Genentech’s TPA sales significantly.117 
By the end of the 1980s, James Watson’s responsibilities had expanded beyond Cold Spring 
Harbor. The concept of sequencing the entire human genome had been transformed from a 
somewhat fanciful idea into an actual project under the purview of the United States government. 
What would become known as the Human Genome Project fell under the auspices of the 
National Institutes of Health, and in April 1988 Watson had been asked by James Wyngaarden, 
then head of the NIH, to serve as associate director of the project.118 Watson would divide his 
time between Cold Spring Harbor and Washington, D.C. He was enthusiastic about the offer, as 
were the Lab’s trustees, who unanimously voted to support his signing on to the project.119 In the 
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midst of the large fundraising drive, Watson shrewdly made clear to Wyngaarden that his 
acceptance of the NIH position would be contingent on whether he received more funding for the 
Neuroscience Center. Wyngaarden responded by urging large foundations to support the 
center.120 To Watson, expanding CSHL was an inevitable response to the larger forces at work in 
the world of science. In October 1989, James Watson wrote to a correspondent, “We have no 
choice but to upgrade ourselves for the biotechnology world of the next century...”121 The 1980s 
had been a time of revolutionary change for CSHL, and the transition to both a new decade and a 
new century was complete. 
 
Beyond the Second Century: 1990-present  
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory’s second century began in 1990 with the celebration of its 
centennial. Biotechnology had become established as part of CSHL’s culture, and though it had 
lost some of its early luster and novelty, involvement in it did not slow down. The 1990s was, for 
CSHL scientists, the decade of increased involvement with start-up companies. One of the most 
notable of such start-ups was a company called ICOS, which was established in 1990. The 
founders of ICOS had previously established themselves as successful and influential figures in 
biotechnology. George Rathmann had founded Amgen, a renowned company, a decade earlier; 
Robert Nowinski had founded Genetic Systems Corporation, and Christopher Henney had 
founded Immunex, a major biotech player in Seattle, where ICOS was based. These 
entrepreneurs, relying on their name recognition, bypassed venture-capital companies and were 
able to secure $33 million from private individuals, including Bill Gates, in order to fund the 
start-up of ICOS.122 Though originally formed to focus on inflammatory diseases, ICOS quickly 
moved in the direction of developing Mike Wigler’s research, completed at CSHL, on 
phosphodiesterases (PDEs).123  
The ICOS founders sought two things. First, they wanted other reputable names in science 
associated with their company. To this end, they asked James Watson to be on the company’s 
scientific advisory board. They also sought technology to develop, and for this they approached 
Mike Wigler, who had just ended a consultancy with Pfizer.124 Wigler’s PDE technology, then, 
formed the basis for ICOS’s early development, and CSHL was given founder’s stock in the 
company. ICOS would go on to become an important manufacturer of the popular drug Cialis. 
                                                          
120 Executive Committee Meeting, 10 June 1988, ibid., 104. 
121 James Watson to John A. Luke, 18 October 1989, Watson Collection, 3/7/3, box 3. 
122 Seattle Post Intelligencer, July 1990, quoted in John Cook, “The early days at ICOS,” Seattle PI blog, 
17 October 2006, accessed 7 June 2012. 
123 ICOS Corporation memo, 9 April 1990, CSHL Archives, Office of Technology Transfer files; Mike 
Wigler, interview by Robert Wargas & Mila Pollock, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 22 March 2013. 
124 Ibid.; Jim Hicks et. al. interview, 11 January 2013; Rich Roberts interview, 12 April 2013. 
23 
 
CSHL ended up getting $3 million from the sale of its stock.125 The company was eventually 
sold to Eli Lilly in 2007.  
Wigler, who by his own admission hadn’t been interested in biotech in the 1980s,126 became a 
notable entrepreneur after his involvement with ICOS. He was one of several CSHL scientists 
who would increase his involvement with biotechnology in the 1990s by establishing several 
start-up companies. These were generally small biotech ventures based on single, specific 
technologies. Wigler started PathoGenesis in 1991 to develop drugs to treat bacterial, viral, and 
fungal infections. The particular targets were serious diseases requiring long-term therapy, such 
as tuberculosis and infections arising from cystic fibrosis.127 In March 1993, the company signed 
a license agreement with CSHL to use a Laboratory-patented method of representational 
genomic analysis in the study of infectious diseases.128 
In a 2013 interview, however, Wigler called PathoGenesis a “wasted opportunity”: though it was 
a company based on solid technology, nothing was developed properly.129 Moreover, a legal 
dispute in 1994 between Wigler and PathoGenesis, in which Wigler was wrongfully accused of 
stealing intellectual property, “severely damaged” his relationship with the company.130 
PathoGenesis was acquired by the Chiron Corporation in 2000 for $700 million.131 
Wigler continued to translate his scientific discoveries into business opportunities. In 1993, he 
and Clark Still of Columbia University formed Pharmacopeia, a company that would use 
combinatorial chemical libraries for drug discovery. Based in Princeton, New Jersey, the 
company was the first to make use of combinatorial chemistry, this novelty, Wigler has said, was 
what made Pharmacopeia successful. Nevertheless, he still felt that Pharmacopeia, like 
PathoGenesis, had potential that was not developed.132 Still another Wigler company, Amplicon, 
was based on his work with Nicholai Lisitsyn in representational difference analysis, a method 
for detecting differences in genomes. Created in 1994 with the help of the Long Island Venture 
Fund, Amplicon sought to identify parts of the human genome that could indicate a 
predisposition to cancer.133  
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Wigler and Lisitsyn devised a method in which a section of DNA from an unhealthy tissue is 
amplified using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and marked on both helical strands. The 
marked DNA is then mixed with pieces of healthy, unmarked DNA. The solution is heated to the 
point where the DNA helices begin to “unzip.” When cooled, all the single strands begin 
“searching” for identical strands to zip themselves back up. The normal strands are able to find 
partners, while the abnormal ones—the ones the investigator is trying to identify—cannot match 
with any others. Consequently, the unhealthy pieces of DNA end up partnering with one another. 
These abnormal sequences are identified by the presence of the two chemical markers used 
before the process was begun.134 
RDA proved immensely useful. It helped Yuan Chang and Patrick Moore, two researchers at 
Columbia University, to identify a virus they believed caused Kaposi's sarcoma in AIDS 
patients,135 and researchers at Abbott Laboratories also used the method to identify three 
unknown hepatitis viruses. In addition, Wigler’s other company, PathoGenesis, used RDA “to 
identify a form of human herpesvirus that may be associated with multiple sclerosis.”136 
Other CSHL scientists who would start companies included David Beach, who had come to 
CSHL in 1982. He would make a name for himself as one of the Laboratory’s most enterprising 
scientists. In 1985, Beach made important discoveries in yeast genetics and produced a string of 
highly regarded and frequently cited papers on the biochemistry of cell division. Along with 
young scientists like Giulio Draetta, Leonardo Brizuela, and Robert N. Booher, Beach clarified 
the molecular pathways that controlled cell division in yeast.137  
Beach established a company called Mitotix in 1992, after a group of investors had approached 
him about the possibility of a start-up venture based on the cell cycle.138 An office was opened in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The establishment of such a company was fortuitous: In late 1993, 
Beach made several breakthroughs in the study of cancer genetics that would form the basis of 
work in Mitotix. One breakthrough was the discovery that the p21 protein was missing [?] in 
cancer cells and was regulated by a critical cell-division and tumor-suppressor gene called p53. 
Beach and his team found that genetic damage could lead to a buildup of the protein produced by 
p53; this activates the p21 gene, whose protein puts the brakes on cell division. Beach’s team 
included Yue Xlong, Greg Hannon, Hui Zhang, David Casso, Manuel Serrano, and Ryuji 
Kobayashi. “Now,” Beach said at the time, explaining the significance of the findings, “we think 
we've found the connecting link between the p53 gene and the inhibition of tumor growth.”139 
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The p53 gene, discovered in 1979, had already been implicated in tumorigenesis. In 1989, Dr. 
Bert Vogelstein and other researchers at Johns Hopkins University had identified p53 in the 
development of colorectal cancer.140 Vogelstein’s work was praised at that the 1989 CSHL 
Symposium.141  
Beach published his findings on p21 in Nature, in the December 16, 1993, issue.142 In a separate 
article in the same issue,143 he announced that the p16 gene inhibits certain enzymes (cyclin-
dependent kinases, or CDKs) that are directly involved in cell division.144 Beach thus suspected 
that p16 played a role in tumor suppression owing to its function as a cell-growth regulator. 
Interestingly, at the same time, Alexander Kamb and Mark Skolnick, researchers at the 
University of Utah and Myriad Genetics, were working on the same gene—but for different 
reasons, and each group was unaware of the other's work. Kamb and Skolnick had found that 
p16 (which they referred to as MTS1, for “multiple tumor suppressor 1”) was either missing 
from, or present in mutated form in, nearly half of 290 tumor samples they had been studying 
over a long time period. They also found that p16/MTS1 is never mutated in or missing from 
non-cancerous cells.145  
These discoveries were an interesting and unexpected confluence of research between two 
separate groups. There immediately arose a conflict, however, since both CSHL and the 
University of Utah had filed patents for p16 and MTS1, respectively, and had granted licenses to 
those patents to Mitotix and Myriad. Since p16 and MTS1 referred to the same gene, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office declared interference in the patent filings.146 According to Beach, 
the patent case was resolved largely in favor of Mitotix, though the company was eventually sold 
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CSHL and the Expansion of Long Island Biotechnology 
James Watson stepped down as CSHL’s director in January 1994, passing the torch to Bruce 
Stillman, who had proven himself as an effective administrator after becoming assistant director 
in 1990. Watson, meanwhile, assumed the newly created position of president, which allowed 
him to continue serving CSHL, especially in fundraising. Stillman assumed the directorship at a 
remarkably young age, having established himself as an important researcher in DNA 
replication, a role he resumed even after undertaking to manage the day-to-day business of the 
Laboratory. Under Stillman’s watch, CSHL would continue to assert itself as a force in 
biotechnology, and, moreover, the Lab would work even harder to make the industry a 
prominent part of the Long Island economy. Because of the increasing presence of biotech 
companies in the area, and the trend among individual scientists to consult and create their own 
companies, one of Stillman’s first moves as director was to focus the Laboratory’s vigilance on 
possible conflicts of interests—a common concern in the previous decade. He instructed the 
Board of Trustees, for instance, that no CSHL scientist should be allowed to serve as the director 
of a biotech company.148  
As start-up companies became more common on Long Island, the opportunities for academic 
science to interact with business enhanced the region’s reputation as a center of American 
biotechnology. This was doubtless due to the presence of major scientific research centers in the 
surrounding area—not just Cold Spring Harbor and SUNY Stony Brook, but also Columbia and 
Rockefeller universities as well as the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. The expansion of 
biotechnology on Long Island coincided with the downturn in the defense industry that occurred 
after the end of the Cold War. Grumman, the defense and aerospace giant that provided the 
island with thousands of jobs, was forced to downsize drastically. The economic vacuum created 
an opportunity for other high technology business,149 and the universities on and near Long 
Island, with the help of the New York State government, began to expand biotechnology. In 
1992, for instance, the Long Island High Technology Incubator opened in Stony Brook.150 
The “incubator” model would prove popular in the biotech industry in general and on Long 
Island in particular. Incubators are clusters of biotech businesses located near major academic 
research centers. Since new biotech companies take some time to become independent, let alone 
successful, it helps to have the guidance and support of established nearby companies. The 
incubators provide reasonably priced space as well as proximity to other companies and 
resources to help nurture the new companies. The concept has grown significantly over the past 
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few decades and is especially common in the high-technology fields.151 Under that model, 
biotechnology has grown considerably in New York. By February 1996, for example, the biotech 
incubator at Stony Brook contained 29 companies, with 25 others occupying spare space.152  
Biotech on Long Island has always been a public-private enterprise. Though led from below by 
entrepreneurial scientists and venture capitalists, the industry has benefited from enormous 
subsidies and assistance on the part of New York State.  In 1996, the state created the Long 
Island Regional Incubator Task Force, a body charged with recommending measures to help 
Long Island’s emerging applied-science sector.153 In September of that year, SUNY Stony Brook 
broke ground on what was to become the Centers for Molecular Medicine and Biology Learning 
Laboratories on their campus.154 CSHL, being one of the premier biological research institutions 
in the country, became central to this public-private revival of Long Island’s industry. Its main 
contribution was what became known as Broad Hollow Bioscience Park. In June 1997, SUNY 
Farmingdale announced that it, along with Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, was proposing a 
biotechnology park on a 20-acre parcel of campus land. The SUNY Board of Trustees had 
already endorsed the proposal.155   
In April 1998, the president of SUNY Farmingdale announced that more than $14 million had 
been awarded to both Farmingdale and CSHL to build the biotech park. This was part of a larger 
New York State plan, which Pataki had announced the previous month, to put $22 million into 
six incubators on Long Island in the biotech, software, and emerging technologies fields.156 
These new centers were the SUNY/CSHL Biotech Park, the North Shore University Hospital 
Biotech Incubator, the Briarcliffe College Software Incubator, the SUNY Stony Brook software 
incubator, the SUNY Farmingdale Manufacturing Incubator, and the Suffolk Community 
College Emerging Technologies Incubator.157  
As of early 1998, 33 percent of the biotech companies in New York State were located on Long 
Island, with Cold Spring Harbor having a sizable share of the market. Up until that time, as 
Morgan Browne told reporters, “the technology and know-how of Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory scientists have already led to the formation of 13 biotechnology companies with a 
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collective market capitalization of more than $1 billion.”158 In October of that year, ground was 
broken for Broad Hollow Bioscience Park at SUNY Farmingdale. Part of the intention of this 
park was to “halt the exodus of biotech startups nurtured at nearby Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory.”159 Clusters of biotech companies, as well as university-affiliated biotech projects, 
were becoming increasingly common. The next year, in November 1999, the Centers for 
Molecular Medicine, begun in 1996, had its grand opening at SUNY Stony Brook. 
Meanwhile, CSHL scientists had continued to make names for themselves in their own business 
pursuits, which were based on breakthroughs they had made in their labs. Tim Tully, a 
neurogeneticist who had come to the Laboratory in 1991, established a company called Helicon 
Therapeutics. Founded in 1997 as a joint venture between CSHL, Oncogene Science, and the 
Hoffman LaRoche pharmaceutical company, Helicon’s focus was drug discovery for memory-
related illness.160 Tully had made a name for himself for his discoveries, with fellow CSHL 
scientists Alcino Silva and Jerry Yin, relating to the effect of the CREB gene on short-term 
memory.  
It was during the latter part of the 1990s that Cold Spring Harbor decided to expand once again, 
this time realizing a long-held plan to turn the Laboratory into a legitimate, degree-granting 
university. This officially happened on September 18, 1998, the result of almost three years of 
work by Laboratory administrators.161 Though CSHL had always taken part in educating 
graduating students, it never conferred its own degrees. (The desire to form a university goes 
back at least to 1989, when James Watson pitched The Lefrak Organization on a $30 million gift 
for CSHL to become “the Caltech of Long Island.”162) Eventually named the Watson School of 
Biological Sciences, the program took its first class in September 1999, offering admission to 
only nine students out of the one-hundred-thirty who had applied. Six students accepted.163 
One year later, in September 2000, Broad Hollow Bioscience Park celebrated its grand opening. 
The park stood as the latest concrete example of the symbiotic relationship between the state and 
private sector. In fact, it is difficult to overstate just how important New York’s state government 
was, and continues to be, toward growing the biotech sector. For Cold Spring Harbor, this state 
assistance has been particularly rewarding. On September 24, 2002, then-New York Governor 
George Pataki announced at CSHL that the state would put another $20 million worth of 
investment into the Laboratory as part of a larger project to create a “biotechnology corridor” on 
                                                          
158 “LI’s Bioscience Boom,” Long Island Business News, 9 February 1998; “‘110 Corridor’ Gets State 
Funding Boost,” Long Island Business News, 16 March 1998. 
159 “Stemming the biotech goodbye tide,” Long Island Business News, 31 August 1998; “Groundbreaking 
Set for Biotech Park,” Newsday, 16 September 1998. 
160 For information on Helicon, see Nichols files, box “Helicon Board Materials,” among others. 
161 Annual Report 1998, 184. 
162 James Watson to Samuel LeFrak, 29 September 1989, Watson Collection, 3/7/3, box 3.  
163 CSHL Annual Report 1999, 173. 
29 
 
Long Island.164 This would eventually take the form of a bioinformatics center on the Laboratory 
campus, construction for which began in July 2005.165 In keeping with CSHL’s history of 
receiving generous donations for private entities, in April 2006 Genentech announced it would 
give CSHL $2.5 million to establish the Genentech Center for the History of Molecular Biology 
and Biotechnology. Located today in the expanded Carnegie Library Building, the center 
contains important historical materials, such as archival collections of important figures like 
James Watson and Sydney Brenner.166 
Since the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003, the fields of molecular biology and 
biotechnology have continued to interact in the hopes of advancing medicine. Genomics has 
become essential to forging new paths in medicine, especially in the field of cancer therapeutics. 
Under Stillman’s leadership, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory remained integral to this discipline 
within the biological sciences, opening its own Genome Center in Woodbury, New York, 
separate from its main campus—“a seed that I hope will lead to Nobel Prizes,” in Stillman’s 
words.167 Along with ten other collaborators, the Laboratory also helped establish the New York 
Genome Center, which shares and integrates research and resources among New York’s major 
biomedical research centers.168 
The future of CSHL’s involvement in biotechnology will depend simply on whether the 
Laboratory chooses to pursue promising ideas, not simply for the sake of starting companies. 
“We’ll do it on a case-by-case basis,” Stillman said in late 2012.169 Whatever the future may 
bring, it is clear that the past was a successful one: According to an official Lab publication, 
from 1987 to 2005, “CSHL generated more than $110 million from technology licensing, start-
up companies, sponsored research, and other commercial activities.”170 But there can be no 
quantifying the change that CSHL has undergone since the biotech revolution began. “I think it 
was a great success,” James Watson said in 2013.171 The transition was not an easy one, but the 
benefits of money, exposure, expansion and innovation were undeniable, as well as essential to 
carrying Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory into the twenty-first century.  
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